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Introduction
A substantial number of central banks in emerging markets use reserve requirements on bank deposits as an additional policy instrument, in conjunction with a conventional interest rate policy. The present study provides empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of reserve requirement changes in this context.
There are several motivations for central banks to vary reserve requirements over the cycle. First, emerging countries are often reluctant to increase interest rates in response to credit booms financed by capital inflows: they fear that higher interest rates attract even more capital inflows and appreciate the currency. 1 In this vein, reserve requirements are discussed as an alternative way to tighten domestic credit conditions (Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999, Montoro and Moreno 2011, Terrier et al., 2011) . Since reserves are often remunerated below market rates, an increase in reserve requirements acts as an implicit tax on the banking sector and widens the spread between deposit and lending rates. The higher spread makes it less attractive for foreign investors to lend to domestic banks and at the same time makes it more expensive for the domestic sector to borrow from banks.
The argument implies that reserve requirement increases may achieve a contraction in domestic credit, without attracting capital inflows and appreciating the currency. The
Turkish central bank, for instance, considers the interest rate as the main instrument for price stability and reserve requirements as the main instrument for financial stability (Başçi, 2010) . In this context, reserve requirements and reserve remuneration are explicitly used as a macroprudential tool. Other countries that adjust reserve requirements with a similar objective as Turkey are, among others, Brazil, Croatia, Columbia, Peru, and Russia (see Lim et al. 2011 for further details). An empirical evaluation of how reserve requirement changes affect domestic credit and external variables is to our knowledge still missing.
Second, reserve requirement policy can also serve to stabilize inflation. An increase in reserve requirements reduces the money multiplier. If the monetary authority keeps the monetary base stable, a reserve requirement increase reduces broad money and raises the interest rate level, which should lower inflation. Today, most countries have an interest rate or exchange rate target to which the monetary base adjusts endogenously. Under such a framework the effects of reserve requirement increases on inflation are therefore less clear from a theoretical perspective. Nonetheless, market observers perceive that 1 Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Calvo et al. (1994) and others discuss the reasons why emerging countries may display a "fear of floating" and are wary of large capital inflows.
some countries, for example China, use reserve requirement policy as a substitute for interest rate policy to contain inflationary pressures.
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The implied argument is that reserve requirement increases may be able to cool down the economy and thereby also lower prices. But also the opposite argument is made: a loosening of reserve requirements in response to capital outflows may be a way to stimulate the economy without creating inflation (see for example Montoro and Moreno, 2011) . Again, an empirical evaluation of the relationship between reserve requirements, overall macroeconomic activity, and inflation seems to be missing.
3
The main contribution of the present paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of reserve requirement changes on key macroeconomic variables. In particular, we are interested in the effect of reserve requirement shocks on (a) domestic credit conditions, (b) the external balance and the exchange rate, and (c) domestic inflation and overall macroeconomic activity. To that purpose, we estimate a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model for the Brazilian economy and identify interest rate and reserve requirement policy shocks. Brazil is well suited for a such study: first, it follows a homogeneous monetary policy framework since 1999, when it adapted inflation targeting, with the short term interest rate as the main instrument. A homogeneous policy framework is important, because the effects of reserve requirement changes depend importantly on the overall central bank policy framework, as we will argue below. Second, Brazil has a long history in the application of time-varying reserve requirements. As a consequence there is sufficient variation in the reserve requirement ratio, which allows the use of modern time series tools. Finally, the Brazilian authorities provide an excellent supply of key macroeconomic time series data at a monthly frequency. Many other countries that use reserve requirements as a policy instrument lack at least one of these characteristics.
Since both interest rate and reserve requirement policy changes affect nominal bank reserves, we need to account for simultaneity and aim to disentangle the two policy shocks with a novel identification scheme, based on a combination of sign and zero restrictions.
Different movements in nominal bank reserves in response to either shock are crucial in our identification approach. To characterize the overall stance of the reserve requirement Much of the current discussion focuses on the question in how far reserve requirement policy can complement conventional interest rate policy to obtain economic and financial stability, but reserve requirements have served a broad set of purposes historically. See our discussion in Section 3 and Goodfriend and Hargraves (1983) for an historical overview about reserve requirement policy in the United States. Montoro and Moreno (2011) and Terrier et al. (2011) discuss the use of reserve requirements as a macroprudential tool in Latin America.
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policy, other variables in addition to the aggregate reserve ratio may have to be considered, such as the rate of reserve remuneration and the type of funding to which the requirement applies. We therefore also provide a brief overview of the reserve requirement system of Brazil and discuss alternative measures of the reserve requirement policy stance in some detail.
To preview our results, we find that both interest rate and reserve requirements increases lead to a contraction in domestic credit, but have very different effects on other macroeconomic variables. A discretionary increase in reserve requirements leads to an exchange rate depreciation and an improvement in the current account, but to an increase in the price level. A discretionary interest hike leads to lower prices, but an exchange rate appreciation and a deterioration of the current account. Our results indicate that in Brazil, reserve requirement increases are a way to reduce credit growth without appreciating the exchange rate, but are an inadequate policy step to reduce inflation.
The results also shed light on the importance of the bank lending channel. It is challenging to evaluate the importance of the bank lending channel empirically with macroeconomic time series data, because it is difficult to distinguish between credit demand and credit supply effects when considering the responses to policy rate movements (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) . 4 Under an interest rate targeting framework, reserve requirements act mainly as a tax on deposits and do not directly affect other forms of lending. For reserve requirements to have macroeconomic effects two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, banks cannot easily find alternative sources of funding that are not subject to reserve requirements. Second, the private sector cannot easily substitute bank credit with other sources of financing. As regards our empirical results, the fall in domestic credit implies that taxed deposits cannot be perfectly substituted by other means of financing. Moreover the effect on macroeconomic activity and inflation shows that the non financial sector cannot perfectly substitute bank credit as a form of financing. Our results therefore indicate that the bank lending channel has some macroeconomic importance in Brazil.
Regarding previous work, there is a large literature that uses structural VARs to identify monetary policy shocks and analyzes their effects on macroeconomic variables (see In response to a monetary contraction, bank credit can fall because of lower credit demand that derives from the generally higher interest rate level and lower economic activity, but is unrelated to the funding costs structure of commercial banks. Many studies (see Takeda et al. 2003 for Brazil) have therefore focused on the cross-sectional dimension, exploiting heterogeneities in the funding composition of banks. Cross-sectional microstudies allow to assess whether a bank lending channel is present, but it is not straightforward to draw conclusions on its macroeconomic importance. In order for reserve requirement changes to have real effects, two conditions need to be fulfilled: The first condition is that deposits cannot be substituted easily as a funding source. Otherwise, banks could compensate the higher deposit funding costs by other financing means such as wholesale funding. Robitaille (2011) analyzes the effects of reserve requirement changes on banks' liability structure in Brazil and finds evidence that banks react to higher reserve requirements by moving away from deposit funding to issuing more certificates of deposits. In general, we would not expect any macroeconomic effects if alternative funding sources are perfect substitutes for deposit funding.
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Section 4 discusses the data sources in more detail.
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The second condition is that firms cannot substitute bank credit with other financing sources easily. If bank lending could be substituted easily, a reserve requirement increase would lead to a decrease in bank credit that would be compensated by an increase in other types of liabilities, for example capital market funding, leaving investment decisions and private sector assets unaffected. Motoki and Funchal (2009) and Zonenschain (1997) provide on overview on the importance of bank funding for firms in Brazil and find bank funding to be important.
The third panel of Figure 1 displays two aggregate measures for reserve requirement ratios as well as the interest rate spread between the lending and the deposit rate. do have an effect on banking spreads, but it is difficult to draw any conclusion on the macroeconomic consequences.
Theoretical Predictions.
In the following we review the theory regarding the effects of reserve requirement changes on credit conditions, external variables, and the domestic macroeconomy under an interest rate policy framework.
We start with domestic credit conditions. If deposits that are subject to reserve requirements are not perfectly substitutable with other sources of funding, higher reserve requirements increase marginal costs for banks. We therefore expect an increase in the lending -deposit rate spread and a fall in aggregate credit.
As far as external variables are concerned, we expect that an increase in reserve requirements triggers an exchange rate depreciation and capital outflows (see for instance Reinhart, 1999, Moreno and Montoro, 2011) . If the key assumption that a lot of funding has to be intermediated by banks that are subject to reserve requirements is correct, the fall in deposit rates decreases the attractiveness to invest in the country from the point of view of foreign investors. Capital flows out and the exchange rate depreciates. Regarding the effect on the domestic macroeconomy, the overall effects of reserve requirements on economic activity and inflation are ambiguous from a theoretical perspective (Glocker and Towbin, 2012). 9 If we focus on the first-round, partial equilibrium, effects, we expect that demand of borrowers and lenders move in opposite directions in response to a reserve requirements hike. The fall in deposit rates should discourage savings and increase lenders' spending. The raise in lending rates should discourage spending by borrowers. The effect on total economic activity will depend on the relative strength of the two responses and general equilibrium effects. A similar argument can be made for the overall effect on inflation. Reserve requirements also act as an implicit tax on deposits and may increase inflation trough a cost channel. The predicted exchange rate depreciation tends to push prices up through higher import prices. The sign on the inflation reaction will therefore depend on the overall effect on aggregate demand, banking costs, and exchange rate pass-through. Evidence from quantitative simulations is available in the cited paper and in an appendix available on request. Remarks: The figure reports statutory reserve requirements next to key macroeconomic variables. The first panel reports the statutory reserve requirements for sight (depósitos a vista), time (depósitos a prazo) and saving deposits (depósitos de poupança). For each of the three categories, the numbers include the additional requirements (exigibilidade adicional). Given its various objectives, the characteristics of reserve requirements as a policy instrument appear closer to those of standard fiscal policy tools than to those of an interest rate policy. Whereas the main aim of interest rate policy is to stabilize prices and the business cycle, reserve requirement and fiscal policy usually also pursue distributional or microeconomic, and potentially distortive, objectives apart from business cycle stabilization. (1)
Central Bank Policy in Brazil

Empirical Model and Identification
A i y t−i + e t , with e t ∼ N(0, Σ) ∀ t = 1, ..., T y t is a vector of endogenous variables, x t is a vector of exogenous variables, e t is a reduced-form error term with variance-covariance matrix Σ, p is the lag length and A and Ψ are coefficient matrices.
Our sample comprises monthly data that cover the period from 1999:7 to 2010:12. We choose the implementation of the inflation targeting regime as the starting date in order to ensure a homogeneous monetary policy framework. The second measure is Weighted Non-Remunerated Reserve Requirements. Sight and saving deposits are not remunerated or at a rate substantially below the SELIC rate.
One part of time deposit reserves has to be invested in government bonds, the other part is remunerated at the SELIC rate (Robitaille, 2011 requirements. It ignores the policy changes that are specific to changes in the exemption thresholds and deductibles. In order to include also these policy changes into an overall measure for the reserve requirement policy, we calculate a measure for aggregate effective reserve requirements as total reserves over total deposits. As can be seen in Figure 1 , our effective reserve requirements measure tends to be below the weighted reserve requirement measure, but follows broadly the same cyclical pattern.
Each measure has its own advantages and disadvantages. Weighted reserve requirements characterize the aggregate stance of reserve requirements, but mix different rates of remuneration. The weighted non-remunerated reserve requirement measure focuses on a segment of reserve requirements where the remuneration is homogeneous, but neglects changes in other reserve requirements. While we expect the macroeconomic effects of non-remunerated reserves to be stronger because of the higher implicit tax on deposits, even reserves that are remunerated at market rates can affect the distribution of lending.
In addition, it deprives banks of a potential mark-up they charge on lending rates and may reduce profits. Both weighted measures neglect changes in the deductible and the exemption threshold. While the effective reserve requirement ratio captures the deductible and the exemption threshold, it is not directly controlled by the central bank, as it is also affected by changes in the relative weight of the respective deposit categories. In 14 As of December 2007, Brazil had 101 banks out of which only 41 were required to hold reserves at the central bank (Robitaille, 2011) . 15 In particular this threshold was raised from 100 million to two billion Reais for time deposits and to one billion Reais for the additional requirements (OECD, 2009). In addition, during the crisis there were further deductibles if large banks lend to small banks, which allowed the central bank to distribute liquidity (Robitaille, 2011) .
what follows, we use weighted total reserve requirements as our main policy variable and compare it to the other two measures.
4.1.2.
Other variables. The vector of endogenous variables includes the consumer price index (CPI), the unemployment rate, the spread between deposit and lending rates, a measure for reserve requirement policy (described above), the policy (SELIC) interest rate, the log of the nominal effective exchange rate, the log of nominal total credit, the current account to GDP ratio and finally the log of nominal compulsory bank reserves.
The current account measures net capital inflows, being the flip side of the financial account. Unemployment is our main measure for economic activity. As a robustness check, we will use industrial production and the gross domestic product as alternative measures. Total bank reserves are computed as the sum of compulsory reserves due to sight, saving and time deposits, including additional requirements. In section 6 we show that our results are robust to alternative measures of central bank liquidity.
In order to control for external effects we include the federal funds rate and a commodity price index with two lags as exogenous variables. The vector of exogenous variables further includes as deterministic variables a quadratic time trend, monthly dummies to control for seasonal affects, and a level dummy between 2002:7 and 2003:7 to control for the financial market turbulences associated with the energy crisis, the Argentinean debt crisis and the election of Lula da Silva as president. We choose a lag length of two 16 and estimate the parameter matrices of the BVAR in equation (1) using Bayesian techniques as outlined in Uhlig (1994) using an uninformative Normal-Wishart prior density for the coefficient matrices and the variance-covariance matrix.
4.2.
Identification. We can think of the one step ahead prediction error e t as a linear combination of orthonormal structural shocks e t = B·v t , with E(v t v t ) = I. The matrix B describes the contemporaneous response of the endogenous variables to structural shocks.
With no additional information or assumptions B is not identified. The only restriction on B that comes from the data is that the matrix multiplied by its transpose must equal the covariance matrix of the prediction errors Σ = E(e t e t ) = E(Bv t v t B ) = BB . This leaves many degrees of freedom in specifying B and further restrictions are necessary to achieve identification.
The challenge for structural VAR models is to find credible restrictions on B. We pursue a partial identification approach to identify a reserve requirement shock and an interest rate policy shock. The main interest of the present study is how macroeconomic variables respond to unexpected changes in reserve requirements. In order to control for the effects of interest rate policy, we also identify an interest rate shock that is orthogonal to the reserve requirement shock. We identify the two shocks with a combination of timing restrictions and sign restrictions. The identification restrictions are summarized in Table   1 .
Regarding the timing (or zero) restrictions, we assume that there is a block of "slow The identification scheme described above allows for an immediate response of the central bank to movements in fast moving variables. A large number of VAR studies identifies interest rate policy shocks with a completely recursive ordering, which imposes that the central bank does not respond immediately to changes in fast moving variables. In our example, such an identification scheme assumes that the central bank does not respond to movements in the volume of credit and foreign exchange market within a month. While such an assumption may be more reasonable for advanced economies, we believe it to be too restrictive for an emerging country, where central banks monitor developments in the financial sector and the exchange rate closely. Second, the ordering of reserve requirement ratios and interest rate policy is not obvious, as there are important interactions between reserve requirement and interest rate policy. We therefore prefer the approach outlined above that mixes zero and sign restrictions. An advantage of exact identification schemes is that they usually give more precise impulse response function estimates, as for a given parameter estimate there is unique matrix B that satisfies the restrictions. All uncertainty derives therefore from sampling uncertainty. Identification based on sign restriction is inexact and there is a set of B matrices that satisfy the restrictions. Total uncertainty is a combination of sampling and identification uncertainty. The researcher therefore faces a familiar trade-off between less restrictive assumptions and more precise estimates.
4.3.
Computational Implementation. We sample the regression coefficients A i and covariance matrix Σ from the posterior distribution. 18 We then multiply V with an 
Notes: Zero restrictions apply to the first month, sign restrictions to the first quarter. The variables are: nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), total aggregate credit (Loans), central bank reserves (Res), the SELIC rate, reserve requirements (RR), the interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates (Spread), the current account over GDP (CA), the price level as measured by the CPI and finally the unemployment rate (U).
orthonormal matrix Q (B = VQ) and compute candidate impulse responses, where Q is a block diagonal matrix of the following form.
and N S is the number of slow moving variables and N F,P is the total number of fastmoving and policy variables. Because Q is block diagonal the property form the Cholesky factorization V that slow moving variables do respond immediately to variations in policy and fast moving variables is maintained. Given the draws, we implement the sign restriction as follows: we compute the Cholesky factorization V of the covariance matrix with the slow moving variables ordered first. 19 Because we are only interest in the responses to interest rate shocks and reserve requirement shocks, the ordering of the slow-moving variables does not matter (Christiano et al. 1999 ). We start with a discussion of the credit market, where we observe a tightening of lending conditions. In response to the increase in reserve requirements, the spread between the lending and deposit rate rises and peaks after about 5 months at about 80 basis points.
The increase is significant and lasts for more than a year. The rise in the spread is consistent with the effects we would expect from a raise in the implicit tax on deposits.
Domestic credit falls initially by about 2.5% and reverts back to zero after about two years.
Turning now to the external sector, we observe a 2% depreciation of the domestic currency and improvement of the current account by more than 0.2 percent of GDP after half a year. A possible interpretation of the finding is that the increase in the tax makes investing in the domestic economy less attractive, capital flows out and the exchange rate depreciates. The depreciation leads to a gain in external competitivness,which improves the current account balance.
The effects on unemployment and the price level have the characteristics of an aggregate supply shock rather than those of a demand shock. The increase in unemployment coincides with a rise in the price level. Unemployment rises by more than 0.1 percentage points within a year. Prices increase by about 0.2 percent within six months. As discussed in Section 2.1, both the effect on overall economic activity and prices are ambiguous from a theoretical perspective. The results indicate that on the real activity side the effects from a decline in the demand of lenders dominates. 20 On the price side, inflationary pressures that arise from the exchange rate depreciation and the increase in production costs prevail.
Regarding the interaction between the interest rate and reserve requirement policy, we observe an increase in the SELIC rate, which indicates that the reduction in central bank liquidity that follows from the reserve requirement hike is only partially accommodated through an increase in nominal reserves. A possible explanation for the increase is an endogenous response of interest rate policy to higher inflation prospects.
Our results are robust to the use of alternative reserve requirement measures. The impulse response functions based on the non-remunerated reserve requirement measure are shown in Figure 2 by the blue dashed lines. Both quantitatively and qualitatively there are no substantial differences. If we use effective reserve requirements as a measure for the policy stance (dash dotted green line), the results are again very similar.
5.2.
Interest Rate Shock. Notes: The numbers shown refer to the reaction of the variables at the initial stage of the shock (one year). The variables are: nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), total aggregate credit, central bank reserves (Res), the SELIC rate, reserve requirements (RR), the interest rate spread between lending and deposit rates (Spread), the ratio of the Current Account (CA) to GDP, the price level as measured by the CPI and finally the unemployment rate (U).
deterioration of the foreign balance is consistent with the effects we would expect from an exchange rate appreciation and the loss in external competitiveness.
The interest shock also has the predicted effects on the credit market. Loans persistently decline by about 1% and the spread between lending and deposit rates rises by about 40 basis points after four months.
Regarding the interaction between the two considered policy instruments, interest rate policy has only weak effects on reserve requirement policy. The reserve requirment ratio tends to fall, but is not significantly different from zero. A negative response of reserve requirements would be consistent with an endogenous response to the deteriorated credit conditions.
5.3.
Reserve requirement and interest rate policy shocks: a comparison. A raise in interest rates and a raise in the reserve requirement ratio are two different possibilities for a central bank to engineer a contraction in credit. Table 2 lists credit "sacrifice ratios", in particular it addresses the question: what does a one percent reduction in loans achieved either through a tightening of interest rates or reserve requirements imply for the movements in other macroeconomic variables. All reported values are averages over the first twelve months, using the specification with the weighted reserve requirements measure. We observe that the two instruments have very different effects on other macroeconomic variables. The exchange rate, the current account and prices move in opposite
directions. An increase in reserve requirements leads to an exchange rate depreciation and a current account surplus, but increases prices. A discretionary interest hike leads to lower prices, but an exchange rate appreciation and a current account deficit. The policy rate has to rise more under an interest rate shock to achieve the required credit reduction, whereas the lending-deposit spread rises by more when the reduction is achieved through an increase in reserve requirements. The result is consistent with the argument that reserve requirement shocks reduce credit mainly through their impact on spreads.
For both shocks a reduction in credit is associated with an increase in unemployment.
However, the increase under the SELIC rate shock is twice as large as under the reserve requirement policy shock. Table 3 Interest rate shocks explain around 20% of the variation in the SELIC rate, whereas reserve requirement shocks explain only about 2%. The finding implies that about four fifth of unexpected movements in interest rates can be explained by the endogenous response to other macroeconomic shocks.
Robustness and Diagnostic Checks
In this section we investigate to what extent the previous results are robust to different measures of prices, real activity and central bank liquidity, instabilities due to different inflation targets possible subsample instabilities, and the role of omitted variables.
6.1. Different Measures for the Prices Indices. The first subplot in Figure 4 shows the results for different price measures. Next to our base measure, the CPI, we plot the responses of the core CPI, the Wholesale Price Index, Producer Price Index and the General Price Index. Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions to a reserve requirement shock, when we use the General Industrial Production Index, the Industrial Production Index for the Manufacturing sector, and real GDP 23 as measure for economic activity.
For all three measures, we can again observe a contraction in overall economic activity.
For the industrial production indices the fall is rather short-lived, but statistically significant. With the Real GDP measure the fall is peristent and the response function reaches its trough after about half a year. Results for the other variables are again similar to the baseline case for all three specification (not shown).
6.3. Different Measures for Central Bank Liquidity. We proceed by using alternative measures for central bank liquidity, which is important for our identification strategy. A change in the level target will change the intercept of the interest rate policy rule. In order to account for changes in the level of the inflation target, we add separate dummy 23 Since there is no measure for real GDP on a monthly frequency available, we use nominal GDP in domestic currency units deflated by the CPI instead. 24 The extended monetary base includes additionally mandatory cash deposits and custody positions in central bank and National Treasury securities. Brazilian authorities consider the extended monetary base more relevant than the narrow monetary base when assessing price stability, "as they more accurately reflect the capacity for substitution between money, narrowly defined, and other financial assets" (see http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/sdds/ingl/ctasanal autmon i.htm) class of general equilibrium models suggests as being jointly generated by various shocks.
Specifically, we compute correlations up to six leads and lags between the shocks and the growth rate of the Brazilian stock market index (BVSP), the oil price
25
, the policy interest rates of the Bank of Japan, the ECB and the Bank of England.
The cross-correlations indicate that none of the omitted variables correlates significantly with the two structural shocks' disturbances.
26 25 We use the cyclical component of the oil price only for checking a possible correlation with the structural disturbances. For this we apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter on the logarithm of the oil price. 26 The statistical importance of the cross-correlations has been judged by means of the upper and lower limits of an asymptotic 95% confidence tunnel for the null hypothesis of no cross-correlation.
Conclusion
The aim of the present paper was to identify the macroeconomic consequences of changes in reserve requirements when the central bank additionally sets the interest rate.
We take the example of Brazil, where we have both a homogeneous monetary policy framework and sufficient variation in reserve requirements. Based on a structural vector autoregressive model, we find that a discretionary increase in reserve requirements leads to a contraction in domestic credit. Moreover, the tightening leads to increases in unemployment, an exchange rate depreciation, a current account surplus, and increases in the price level. Our results indicate that reserve requirements provide a potential way to curb credit growth without attracting net capital inflows and appreciating the exchange rate. It is, however, doubtful whether reserve requirements are an appropriate tool to achieve price stability under an interest rate policy framework. Our results have focused on the use of reserve requirements under inflation targeting. We expect, however, substantially different effects under other central bank policy frameworks, for example, if reserve requirements are used to achieve a given money growth target.
Regarding interest rate policy, our results are in line with standard economic theory.
Positive interest rate surprises coincide with a contraction in credit, an exchange rate appreciation, increases in unemployment, and a decline in inflation. The results are therefore in line with arguments that ascribe interest rate policy an important role to control price fluctuations, but also with arguments that emphasize the dilemma monetary policy faces when dealing with capital inflows (IMF, 2007) . In that sense, reserve requirement policy can serve as a complement to interest rate policy for financial stability consideration, but cannot be its substitute with regards to a price stability objective. Our analysis has focused on the short term effects of reserve requirement changes. The effect of higher reserve requirement levels on the costs of financial intermediation and long term growth prospects is another important aspect that policy makers need to consider. 
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